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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE “FRANKENFISH”?:   
THE FDA’S FOOT-DRAGGING ON TRANSGENIC 
SALMON 
Lars Noah* 
 I wonder where that fish has gone. –Monty Python1 
 
AquaBounty Technologies has genetically modified the Atlantic salmon 
through the introduction of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon, 
which allows the fish to reach market size almost twice as quickly as its farmed 
counterparts.  The research began more than two decades ago.2  The company 
secured licenses for the patents that emerged out of this research,3 and its plans to 
commercialize the transgenic salmon (branded “AquAdvantage”) took shape more 
than a decade ago.4  In late 2010, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
appeared to be on the verge of authorizing production,5 but, more than two years 
later, the company continues to await the agency’s blessing. 
With AquaBounty facing bankruptcy,6 a group of biotechnology researchers 
and entrepreneurs wrote President Obama to denounce the political meddling that 
apparently had stalled the review process.7  Shortly thereafter, the FDA took a 
tentative further step toward approval, issuing a draft environmental assessment 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, University of Florida; author of LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2012).  As a longstanding vegetarian, my interest in this 
subject is solely theoretical. 
 1. MONTY PYTHON’S THE MEANING OF LIFE (Universal Pictures 1983) (from “The Middle of the 
Film”). 
 2. See Tony Reichhardt, Will Souped up Salmon Sink or Swim?, 406 NATURE 10 (2000); Ross 
Anderson, Controversy Surrounds “Supersalmon” Genetics:  Some Hail Fast-Growing, Farm-Raised 
Fish as an Economic Miracle While Others Fear a “Frankenfish” Biological Disaster, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 3, 1999, at 1A; New Prospects for Gene-Altered Fish Raise Hope and Alarm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at C4. 
 3. See Matthew Perrone, Fast-Growing Fish May Never Wind up on Your Plate, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 4, 2012. 
 4. See Hannah Hoag, Transgenic Salmon Still out in the Cold in United States, 421 NATURE 304 
(2003); Marc Kaufman, “Frankenfish” or Tomorrow’s Dinner?; Biotech Salmon Face a Current of 
Environmental Worry, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2000, at A1; Andrew Martin, One Fish, Two Fish, 
Genetically New Fish: Firm Seeks OK for Altered Salmon, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2003, at 1; Carol 
Kaesuk Yoon, Altered Salmon Leading Way to Dinner Plates, but Rules Lag, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, 
at A1. 
 5. See Gautam Naik, Gene-Altered Fish Close to Approval, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at A1; 
Andrew Pollack, Panel Leans in Favor of Engineered Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at B3. 
 6. See Andrew Pollack, Betting on a Fish, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2012, at B1; see also Adrianne 
Appel, Caught in Troubled Waters: Firm’s Genetically Engineered Salmon Facing Fierce Opposition, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 2012, at B5 (reporting that “AquaBounty’s fiscal struggles are not unusual for 
a biotechnology start-up awaiting federal approval,” and adding that more than $60 million has been 
invested in the company since its launch in 1991). 
 7. See Rosie Mestel, FDA Too Slow to Approve Biotech Foods?; Products Made from Genetically 
Modified Animals Are Trapped in an Endless Logjam, Scientists Complain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at 
A1. 
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(EA) at the end of 2012.8  In explaining why it would allow no more than sixty 
days for the submission of written comments, the agency noted that its draft EA 
differed little from the one that it had made available more than two years earlier,9 
which makes one wonder what exactly it had done during the interim.10  If history 
is any guide, this next step in what has become a tortuous review process does not 
portend imminent approval: the FDA again will receive thousands of largely 
duplicative adverse public comments, and members of Congress representing 
constituents threatened economically by approval of the AquAdvantage salmon 
again will pressure the agency.11  Will regulatory officials manage to ignore the 
static this time around when they seemed incapable of doing so just two years 
earlier? 
I.  MISPLACED CRITICISMS OF THE GE SALMON 
In order to tell the tale of this fish, my Essay uses a pair of recent law review 
pieces on the subject as a foil.  Patently silly mistakes that get published all too 
often find an uncritical audience that then may replicate the errors and distort the 
legal academic commentary on a particular subject.12  Although I focus on flaws in 
a couple of recent student-authored articles,13 similar mistakes appear in the work 
                                                                                                     
 8. See FDA, Notice of Availability, Draft Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Finding of 
No Significant Impact Concerning a Genetically Engineered Atlantic Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,050 
(Dec. 26, 2012). 
 9. See id. (explaining that “the substance of this draft EA was made available to the public in 
advance of the Agency’s 2010 Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee meeting”).  Nonetheless, the 
agency later announced a two month extension.  See FDA, Notice, Draft Environmental Assessment and 
Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact Concerning a Genetically Engineered Atlantic Salmon; 
Extension of Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 10,620 (Feb. 14, 2013).  
 10. See Brady Dennis, For Both Sides, Bigger Fish to Fry, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2012, at A1 
(“Friday’s determination echoes findings from two years ago . . . .  Since then, the approval process for 
the fish has remained at a virtual standstill.  But the public fight over it has churned on.”); Andrew 
Pollack, Engineered Fish Moves Step Closer to Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at B1 (“The 
environmental assessment is dated May 4.  It is unclear why it took until now for it to be released, but 
supporters of the salmon say they believe it is because the Obama administration was afraid of an 
unfavorable consumer reaction before the election in November.”); id. (“An article in Slate earlier this 
week said the White House had been delaying release of the environmental assessment for political 
reasons, violating the Obama administration’s pledge to make decisions based on science.  The [EA] 
was released soon afterward.”). 
 11. See Dennis, supra note 10, at A1 (“Rep. Don Young (R-Alaska) . . . wants to force delays in any 
FDA approval.  ‘If I can keep this up long enough, I can break that company,’ he said, referring to 
AquaBounty, ‘and I admit that’s what I’m trying to do.’”).  This happened in spite of the apparently 
careful timing of the agency’s announcement.  See Rosie Mestel, Genetically Engineered Salmon Clears 
FDA Hurdle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at AA1 (reporting that “the FDA’s actions—and the timing of 
its announcement, on the eve of a holiday weekend—drew outrage from consumer advocacy groups”); 
cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight?  Timing and Transparency in the 
Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1158 & n.5, 1161-63, 1208-09 (2009) (discussing 
anecdotal evidence of this practice, but concluding that it is neither as frequent nor as effective as 
commonly assumed); Ed O’Keefe, A Look at the “Holiday News Dump,” WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2012, at 
A15. 
 12. See, e.g., Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 383 & n.50, 400-04 (2005). 
 13. On the undoubted difficulties of undertaking such work, see Andrew Yaphe, Taking Note of 
Notes: Student Legal Scholarship in Theory and Practice, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 259 (2012). 
608 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2 
of more seasoned authors as well,14 but I will not take this occasion to repeat my 
previously published critiques of faculty articles related to genetically engineered 
(GE) fish and foods.15 
A.  Technological Misconceptions 
The most recently published piece on the transgenic Atlantic salmon appeared 
one year ago in the Minnesota Journal of International Law, a Note by Katherine 
Wilinska that promised an analysis of the FDA’s review of AquaBounty’s 
application as contrasted with the European Union’s handling of such matters.16  
The first thing that is striking about this piece: fundamental misunderstandings 
about the underlying technology.  Wilinska repeatedly asserted that the 
AquAdvantage enjoyed superior cold tolerance by virtue of an “antifreeze” gene 
inserted from the ocean pout.17  The only source that she cited for this claim—the 
briefing packet that the FDA had prepared in advance of the Veterinary Medicine 
Advisory Committee (VMAC) meeting—says nothing of the sort.18  The gene 
sequence from the ocean pout only serves as a promoter for the transgene from the 
Chinook salmon, resulting in growth hormone production even during colder 
months when the fish normally would not produce these proteins. 
Wilinska also repeatedly asserted that the AquAdvantage would grow “several 
times bigger than” its wild cousins.19  If true, that would be quite a monstrosity!20  
The single source that she cited did reveal a dramatic size differential among 
                                                                                                     
 14. For a quasi-Marxist (and not terribly rigorous) analysis recently published by a pair of 
sociologists, see Rebecca Clausen & Stefano B. Longo, The Tragedy of the Commodity and the Farce of 
AquAdvantage Salmon®, 43 DEV. & CHANGE 229, 233, 243-49 (2012); id. at 243 (calling it “a salmon 
without a ‘soul’”); id. at 244 (noting “how the state’s incomplete regulatory regime accommodates 
industry requests for minimal oversight”); id. (“The FDA . . . is failing to consider the full range of 
socio-ecological impacts that may result from this new invention.”); id. at 246 (“In the case of 
AquAdvantage Salmon, a patented fish can displace traditional salmon fishers, with no hopes of 
extending the benefits to the millions of artisanal fishermen worldwide.”). 
 15. See Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution:  Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become 
Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶¶ 61-64, 67-71 (2006).  Genetically modified (GM) is 
synonymous with GE or “transgenic.” 
 16. See Katherine Wilinska, Note, AquAdvantage Is Not Real Advantage:  European Biotechnology 
Regulations and the United States’ September 2010 FDA Review of Genetically Modified Salmon, 21 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 145 (2012). 
 17. See id. at 148, 149, 164. 
 18. FDA CTR. FOR VETERINARY. MED., BRIEFING PACKET FOR VMAC., AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 
65, 66, 75 (2010) [hereinafter BRIEFING PACKET], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicine
AdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf. 
 19. Wilinska, supra note 16, at 149; see also id. at 164, 172; Chad West, Note, Economics and 
Ethics in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 413, 428 (2006) (crediting claims 
by an “activist group” that the transgenic salmon would grow to unusual sizes and suffer from grotesque 
abnormalities); cf. id. at 418 n.25 (noting that scientists discovered that the “antifreeze” transgene failed 
to improve cold tolerance). 
 20. Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Note, The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh: Federal Regulation of 
Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1529 & n.2 (1986) (alluding to a quip made by an 
EPA official).  See generally HENRY I. MILLER & GREGORY CONKO, THE FRANKENFOOD MYTH:  HOW 
PROTEST AND POLITICS THREATEN THE BIOTECH REVOLUTION (2004) (reacting to the unfounded horror 
stories spread by activists opposed to GE crops). 
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juvenile fish,21 but that unsurprising result simply demonstrated that the transgene 
worked as advertised.  Nothing suggests that transgenic salmon would continue 
growing well beyond the normal size of mature Atlantic salmon.22 
These are not minor quibbles either.  Wilinska’s assessment of the purportedly 
dire environmental consequences flowing from the possibility of escape depends 
centrally on assertions about the transgenic salmon outcompeting its wild 
counterparts.23  The scientific literature on this question offers far more complex 
and cautious predictions about what might happen should the AquAdvantage get 
out,24 avoiding exaggerations founded upon misconceptions about the animal’s 
greater cold tolerance and adult size.25  Wilinska also made several references to 
                                                                                                     
 21. See BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 18, at 65-66.  On these pages, the FDA discussed—and 
reproduced part of a table from—a study published in a peer-reviewed journal:  Shao Jun Du et al., 
Growth Enhancement in Transgenic Atlantic Salmon by the Use of an “All Fish” Chimeric Growth 
Hormone Gene Construct, 10 NATURE BIOTECH. 176 (1992).  This did show dramatic size differences 
between GE salmon (averaging over forty-seven grams) and non-GE salmon (averaging over nine 
grams) fourteen months after the injection of the gene construct into some of the eggs.  See id. at 178 
tbl.1.  That converts to roughly 0.1 lbs. vs. 0.02 lbs.  Farmed non-GE salmon reach a market size of 
approximately eight lbs. after almost three years; GE salmon do so in roughly half the time but do not 
continue growing beyond normal adult size.  See Martin, supra note 4, at 1. 
 22. See Alice McCarthy, Genetically Modified Salmon Vying for a Spot at the Dinner Table, 18 
CHEM. & BIO. 1, 1 (2011) (“It does not make the fish grow to larger sizes, just more quickly.”); Erik 
Stokstad, Engineered Fish: Friend or Foe of the Environment?, 297 SCIENCE 1797, 1799 (2002) 
(“Although the fish don’t end up larger than normal farmed Atlantic salmon, they reach market size up 
to a year sooner.”). 
 23. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 150 (“[A] mere 25% size advantage is enough to push smaller 
fish away from feeding and mating grounds.  Thus, one can presume that AAS [AquAdvantage 
Salmon], which has a significant size advantage over its natural cousin, could decimate the natural 
salmon population.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 172 (alluding to “the catastrophic and 
irreversible environmental consequences in case of escape or malicious release”); id. at 176 (“FDA 
approval of AAS will trigger developments that are inestimable and dangerous . . . .  [It] has an impact 
on the health of millions and on ecosystems around the world.”). 
 24. See Alison L. Van Eenennaam & William M. Muir, Transgenic Salmon: A Final Leap to the 
Grocery Shelf?, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 706, 708-09 (2011).  For a recent paper that canvasses much of 
the prior literature and suggests the complexities in predicting environmental effects, see Robert N.M. 
Ahrens & Robert H. Devlin, Standing Genetic Variation and Compensatory Evolution in Transgenic 
Organisms: A Growth-Enhanced Salmon Simulation, 20 TRANSGENIC RESEARCH 583 (2011) (focusing 
on Coho salmon).  For papers that consider the full range of genetic modifications in aquaculture and 
include discussions of human health effects as well as environmental concerns, see Olivier le Curieux-
Belfond et al., Factors to Consider Before Production and Commercialization of Aquatic Genetically 
Modified Organisms: The Case of Transgenic Salmon, 12 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 170 (2009); and 
Rosalee S. Rasmussen & Michael T. Morrissey, Biotechnology in Aquaculture:  Transgenics and 
Polyploidy, 6 COMPREHENSIVE REVS. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 2 (2007). 
 25. One decade ago, similar misconceptions greeted the arrival of the “GloFish,” zebra danios with 
a gene inserted from sea anemone, which gives them a red glow that becomes luminescent under black 
light.  See Noah, supra note 15, ¶¶ 61-64 & n.229; see also Int’l Ctr. Tech. Assessment v. Leavitt, 468 
F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting a judicial challenge to the FDA’s decision against subjecting 
the GloFish to premarket review as a new animal drug).  In 2012, after having sold millions of GloFish, 
Yorktown Technologies introduced the “Electric Green Tetra,” another freshwater aquarium fish 
genetically engineered to fluoresce, leading some environmentalists to voice concerns because tetra can 
survive in cooler water than zebra danios.  See Adrianne Appel, Neon-Bright Fish Slip Through 
Regulatory Net: Now What?, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2012, at E1 (reporting that GE tetra might become 
invasive in places such as south Florida).  I’d be more worried about the giant Burmese pythons that 
have established themselves down there!  See Beth Kassab, State Should Put Bounty on Pythons, 
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fears about heightened allergenicity.26  The FDA dismissed this concern in a 
conclusory fashion precisely because no one takes it seriously in this context.  
Anyone allergic to salmon will avoid all types of salmon, and nothing suggests that 
the somewhat elevated levels of growth hormone in the AquAdvantage will cause 
any greater reaction in sensitive consumers.27 
B.  Regulatory Classification and Review 
Wilinska’s criticism of the FDA’s review process also springs from a number 
of fairly grievous missteps.  She repeatedly referred to the briefing packet that the 
FDA prepared for the advisory committee as if it represented the company’s 
submission to the agency, faulting its relative brevity (a mere 180 pages in length) 
and conclusory nature.28  Instead, of course, as it makes clear from the outset, that 
document amounts to a summary of the FDA’s internal reviews of the company’s 
far more voluminous submissions.29  Wilinska also complained that, unlike its 
European counterpart, the agency fails to undertake independent reviews of 
applications.30  True, the FDA conducts little in the way of intramural research,31 
but that hardly means it only engages in passive reviews of drug approval 
applications.32  The advisory committee meeting further exposed the agency’s 
                                                                                                     
ORLANDO SENT., Aug. 16, 2012, at A1 (referencing the recent capture of a record-setting specimen that 
measured more than seventeen feet long and carried eighty-seven eggs, just one among the tens of 
thousands of these invasive constrictors living in south Florida). 
 26. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 171-72. 
 27. See BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 18, at 75; see also Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 
1184-85 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (discussing similar conclusions that the agency reached when it approved a 
recombinant growth hormone drug for dairy cows).  In contrast, the FDA takes allergenicity issues quite 
seriously when GE foods might express proteins ordinarily not found in an item.  See Noah, supra note 
15, ¶ 39 & n.143. 
 28. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 149, 154, 171. 
 29. See BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 18, at ii; Andrew Pollack, Modified Salmon Is Safe, F.D.A. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at B1; see also 21 C.F.R. § 14.33(f) (2012) (specifying the materials 
that the agency must compile for members of advisory committees). 
 30. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 157 & n.90, 164, 168; see also id. at 154 (“In approving GM 
foods, the FDA looks only at research information provided by the applicant and does not conduct its 
own independent research . . . .”); id. at 172 (suggesting that the agency “set up its own research body to 
evaluate the scientific conclusions submitted in the application”). 
 31. See Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 431, 444 (2008); David Warsh, Needed: Science Czar for the FDA, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 
1997, at F1. 
 32. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1765-66, 1776-84, 1797-99, 1852-53 (1996); Gardiner Harris, Where Progress Is 
Rare, the Man Who Says No, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at A1 (profiling Dr. Richard Pazdur, the 
FDA’s chief (and often vilified) reviewer of cancer drugs); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 
312, 318 (2008) (explaining that the agency “spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing” applications 
for device approval); id. at 343 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “the process for approving new 
drugs is at least as rigorous as the premarket approval process for medical devices”); Lars Noah & 
Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 329, 390-92 (1998) (discussing FDA review of food additive petitions); id. at 401-21 (detailing 
three case studies). 
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decision-making process to external scrutiny,33 and the transgenic salmon has 
gotten plenty of attention from other expert panels as well.34 
Wilinska also faulted the FDA for relying on its arguably inapt authority over 
animal drugs.  First, she questioned the agency’s decision insofar as it failed to 
invoke more directly relevant authority,35 not recognizing that the guidance 
document she cited lacks any binding effect.36  Second, she wondered “[w]ould the 
definition apply to a human who consumes AAS flesh and the rDNA with it? . . .  
[I]f rDNA is considered a ‘drug,’ does it stop being a drug before ingestion by 
consumers?”37  One could say the very same thing about any drug intended for use 
in livestock that leaves residues.  The simple answer to this apparent regulatory 
inconsistency:  the new animal drug has no intended therapeutic (or structure-or-
function) use in humans who later may consume it.38 
Requiring new animal drug approval (NADA) for GE livestock does not 
amount to fitting a square peg into a round hole.39  The FDA has a long (and 
                                                                                                     
 33. See FDA, Notice of Meeting, VMAC, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,605 (Aug. 26, 2010); see also Lars Noah, 
Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 1033, 1054 (2000) (discussing the FDA’s reliance on advisory committees). 
 34. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY (CEQ) & OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y 
(OSTP), GROWTH-ENHANCED SALMON, CASE STUDY NO. 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/Issues/ceq_ostp_study2.pdf; see also Andrew Pollack, 
Study Faults U.S. on Assessing Altered Fish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at A16 (discussing a report 
issued by the Pew Initiative on Food & Biotechnology, which echoed concerns of the National Research 
Council). 
 35. Wilinska, supra note 16, at 166–67. 
 36. See FDA, Notice of Availability, Guidance for Industry on Regulation of Genetically 
Engineered Animals Containing Heritable Recombinant DNA Constructs, 74 Fed. Reg. 3057 (Jan. 16, 
2009); see also 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(d) (2012); Lars Noah, The FDA’s New 
Policy on Guidelines:  Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 119-20 (1997).  
The agency had made a draft available several months earlier and invited comments.  See FDA, Notice 
of Availability, Guidance for Industry: Regulation of Genetically Engineered Animals Containing 
Heritable rDNA Constructs, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,407 (Sept. 19, 2008); Jane Zhang, FDA Plans Rules for 
Modified Food Animals—Guidelines to Focus on Safety Issues, Claims of Producers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
19, 2008, at A12; see also Andrew Pollack, Rules Near for Animals’ Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2008, at C15 (“The F.D.A. has been considering a policy for more than 15 years and its delay has irked 
both the industry and the critics of biotechnology.”). 
 37. Wilinska, supra note 16, at 165. 
 38. See Karen Kaplan & Thomas H. Maugh II, For Genetically Modified Animals, Rules Are Ready:  
The FDA Unveils an Approval Process That Opens a Road from Farm to Market for the Creatures, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A24 (“Technically, it is not the modified animals but the added DNA 
segments that are considered drugs.  Realistically, however, the only way to regulate the property-
changing DNA is to regulate the animal, said Eric Flamm, a policy advisor at the agency. . . .  The new 
rules do not envision feeding the products to humans in the equivalent of clinical trials for drugs.”); cf. 
Noah, supra note 15, ¶ 58 & n.208 (discussing the genetic modification of animals to produce human 
drugs); Shankar Vedantam, Drug Made in Milk of Altered Goats Is Approved, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 
2009, at A5.  One could, however, ask at exactly what point in the animal’s lifecycle does it stop 
qualifying as a drug: is it only upon death when harvested?  Moreover, assuming a stable alteration of 
the germline (and that the transgenic animals manage to breed with one another in spite of efforts to 
prevent it), are the progeny also regulated as drugs? 
 39. See Graham M. Wilson, Note, A Day on the Fish Farm: FDA and the Regulation of 
Aquaculture, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 378 (2004) (“[T]he NADA process, with its safety, effectiveness 
and limited environmental impact requirements, may provide adequate pre-market review to evaluate 
most concerns regarding genetically modified animals . . . .  [These will] undergo a much more intensive 
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sometimes controversial) history of creatively interpreting its statutory authority to 
regulate novel technologies.40 Viewing a transgenic salmon’s gene construct as 
analogous to an animal drug does not, however, seem particularly far-fetched:  in 
theory, one could feed supplemental growth hormone to farmed Atlantic salmon.41  
The transgene delivers the same protein more efficiently—and, to detractors of GE 
animals, it does so permanently (and perpetually into future generations).42 
Two decades ago, the licensing of a growth hormone product for injection into 
dairy cows created a similar stir.  In 1993, after reviewing its safety and 
effectiveness, the FDA approved the new animal drug Posilac® (recombinant 
bovine somatotropin (rBST)).43  Although critics focused their attacks on the use of 
genetic engineering to produce this drug, no one doubted that it would have to 
satisfy NADA requirements.  Because the agency could detect no difference 
between milk from cows administered rBST and other milk, it did not require any 
special disclosure statement in labeling.44 
C.  Demands for Disclosure 
Wilinska, like other commentators before her, advocated consumer labeling to 
reveal that AquaBounty had genetically modified its salmon.45  If allergenicity 
concerns had any merit, then the FDA would require some disclosure.46  In the 
                                                                                                     
screening process than comparable genetically engineered changes to plants.”).  For a warning about 
regulatory tunnel-vision flowing from use of the NADA framework, see Martin D. Smith et al., 
Genetically Modified Salmon and Full Impact Assessment, 330 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2010) (“This 
approach fails to acknowledge that the new product’s attributes may affect total production and 
consumption of salmon.  This potentially excludes major human health and environmental impacts, both 
benefits and risks.”); id. at 1053 (“This narrow focus may derive from FDA’s decision to treat GM fish 
as an animal drug rather than as a food; aggregate exposure to a drug is substantially shaped by disease 
incidence, whereas aggregate exposure to a food is driven more by market prices.”); id. (recognizing 
that the FDA could construe its authority more broadly to consider such factors). 
 40. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and 
Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 917 (2008). 
 41. See Mark Fischetti, A Feast of Gene-Splicing Down on the Fish Farm, 253 SCIENCE 512 (1991) 
(reporting that efforts to feed synthetic growth hormone to farmed fish proved to be uneconomical). 
 42. See Jill U. Adams, Biotech Animals: Scoping out a New Breed of Rules; Are Genetically 
Engineered Fish and Meat Coming Soon?  We Examine the Food and Drug Administration’s 
Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at F1 (quoting Gregory Jaffe of the Center for Science in the 
Public Interest). 
 43. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.2112 (2012); see also FDA, Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related Products; 
Sterile Sometribove Zinc Suspension, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946 (Nov. 12, 1993) (elaborating on this 
decision); Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1191-92 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (rejecting a judicial 
challenge to the approval); Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating 
Recombinant BST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227 (1997) (defending the decision). 
 44. See FDA, Notice, Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from 
Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (Feb. 10, 1994); 
see also Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1192-93 (rejecting challenge to the FDA’s decision against mandating 
rBST disclosure in labeling); Noah, supra note 15, ¶ 40 (elaborating); cf. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. 
Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 635-50 (6th Cir. 2010) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds one state’s 
prohibition on “rBST-free” labeling, but affirming in part a disclaimer requirement). 
 45. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 169, 176; see also Wilson, supra note 39, at 387-94. 
 46. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS 
CONTAINING HERITABLE RDNA CONSTRUCTS 15, 24 (2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndust
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absence of such concerns, however, what point would labeling serve other than an 
attempt to stigmatize the product in the minds of unsophisticated consumers?47  
Should farm-raised salmon also carry such labeling, so that buyers can understand 
the health and ecological consequences of their purchasing decisions,48 and which 
way do those cut?49  In light of currently unlabeled hazards associated with 
mercury and other pollutants in several types of seafood,50 and outright fraud when 
identifying the species of fish for sale (which itself can pose health hazards due to 
unexpected exposures to known allergens and toxins),51 the fuss over labeling of 
GE salmon strikes me as seriously misplaced.52 
                                                                                                     
ry/UCM113903.pdf; see also Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178-79 & n.8 
(D.D.C. 2000) (discussing similar FDA policy applicable to plant-derived foods). 
 47. See Amy Harmon & Andrew Pollack, Battle Brewing over Labeling of Genetically Modified 
Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, at A1.  Arguably, it would do so in an entirely counterproductive 
fashion.  Cf. Smith et al., supra note 39, at 1052 (“[T]he consequences of small differences in the 
nutritional and health profiles (if any) of one GM salmon compared with one non-GM salmon could be 
dwarfed by the public health benefits from substantial growth in the salmon market [because of reduced 
production costs] and from the eating of more salmon in place of other proteins such as beef.”); id. at 
1052-53 (“[I]f GM salmon expands the aggregate salmon market, more consumers will eat more salmon 
and less of other proteins that are lower in omega-3 fatty acids, which would improve public health.”); 
Faye Flam, Genetically Modified Salmon Could Be Sold in Two Years, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 2010, 
at D1. 
 48. See Marian Burros, Issues of Purity and Pollution Leave Farmed Salmon Looking Less Rosy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at F1; Carolyn Butler, It’s Good to Eat Fish, Especially If You Choose 
Where it Comes From, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2012, at E4 (reporting concerns about drug residues, 
organic pollutants, and reduced nutritional value in farmed salmon and other fish, especially imports); 
Devra First, Catch of the Day?: Wild Salmon Is Threatened, and the Farm-bred Alternative Raises 
Concerns, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2008, at E1.  Sellers already must reveal that certain color additives 
are used in feed to make the salmons’ flesh pink.  See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 
1173-74 (Cal. 2008). 
 49. See Elizabeth Cooney, Fishing for Facts: Good for Your Health, or Toxic to You and the 
Environment: It’s Hard to Know What Fish to Eat, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2009, at G6 (“There are 
good and bad ways to farm fish, just as there are good and bad ways to catch fish in the ocean.”); see 
also Claire S. Carroll, Comment, What Does “Organic” Mean Now?  Chickens and Wild Fish Are 
Undermining the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 138-39 
(2004) (explaining why only farmed fish should qualify for organic labeling).  
 50. See Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 251-56 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to 
find federal preemption of failure-to-warn claim where the FDA had failed to require mercury 
disclosures on tuna labels); Marian Burros, More Testing of Seafood to Address Mercury Concerns, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at F1. 
 51. See Beth Daley & Jenn Abelson, From Sea to Sushi Bar, a System Open to Abuse, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2011, at B1; Kim Severson, Under Many Aliases, Mislabeled Foods Find Their Way to 
Dinner Tables, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A15; see also Kirk Johnson, Survey Finds That Fish Are 
Often Not What Label Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A13 (“Almost two-thirds of the ‘wild’ 
salmon samples, for example, were found actually to be farmed Atlantic salmon, which is considered 
less healthy and environmentally sustainable.”). 
 52. For more on the agency’s general policies on the labeling of GE foods, see FDA, Notice of 
Availability, Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have 
Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839 (Jan. 18, 2001); Carl R. Galant, 
Comment, Labeling Limbo: Why Genetically Modified Foods Continue to Duck Mandatory Disclosure, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 125 (2005); Kelly A. Leggio, Comment, Limitations on the Consumer’s Right to 
Know:  Settling the Debate over Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods in the United States, 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 893, 948-50 (2001) (defending the FDA’s policy).  California voters recently rejected an 
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D.  Legislative Resistance: State and Federal 
Wilinska cautioned, without any citation or further elaboration, that, “once the 
FDA allows it on the market, [AquAdvantage salmon] can be sold in each state 
regardless of the state’s residents’ opinion of GM foods.”53  In fact, some states 
already have acted preemptively against transgenic fish: a few banned their use in 
aquaculture within state borders,54 a few others required special permits for such 
uses,55 and Alaska has mandated disclosures at retail.56  Securing a federal license 
would not necessarily preempt the operation of such more restrictive state laws,57 
even if motivated primarily by protecting the economic interests of local fishermen. 
Wilinska noted congressional resistance to the transgenic salmon, but she 
apparently failed to understand that unicameral passage of proposed legislation 
does not suffice.58  Although House adoption of an appropriations rider may send a 
message to agency officials even if the Senate fails to concur, this signal emanated 
from the same deliberative body that kept pointlessly voting to repeal the health 
                                                                                                     
initiative to require such labeling.  See Andrew Pollack, After Loss, the Fight to Label Modified Food 
Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B4. 
 53. Wilinska, supra note 16, at 168-69.  Although the failure to secure a required NADA would 
prevent retail sale of food derived from animals administered the drug, approval of an application does 
not amount to FDA licensure of the resulting food product; it simply removes the primary obstacle to its 
sale under federal law.  An equally subtle distinction in this statute once befuddled members of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. Public Health 
Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 54-55 & n.110 (2011). 
 54. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 15007 (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-76-100 (2012) 
(“The use of transgenic fish . . . is prohibited.”); see also ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.100(d) (2012) 
(prohibiting the use of any Atlantic salmon in aquaculture); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 671(c)(11), 
671.1(a)(8) (2012) (determining that live transgenic aquatic animals pose a threat to native wildlife and 
cannot be imported or possessed without a permit issued by the Fish and Game Commission); Jane Kay, 
“Frankenfish” Spawn Controversy:  Debate over Genetically Altered Salmon, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 
2002, at A4 (discussing initial legislative reaction in California and other states). 
 55. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.874(9), 324.41305(a) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
79-22-9(1)(d) (2012); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 635-007-0595 (2012) (barring “the release of transgenic 
fish into locations where such fish may gain access to wild fish populations”). 
 56. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.040(a)(14). 
 57. This question arose in connection with the FDA’s approval of the abortifacient drug previously 
known as RU-486, though state restrictions in that context would confront additional constitutional 
obstacles.  See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the 
FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 599-603 (2001); see also Planned Parenthood 
v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006) (invalidating a state law that had attempted to prevent the off-label 
use of this drug at lower dosages or later in pregnancy). 
 58. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 151 (“Congress voted in June 2011 to prohibit the FDA from 
approving GM salmon.”).  House Amendment 449 to the “Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and 
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act” for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 2112, 
§ 744, 112th Cong. (June 16, 2011), does not appear in the version enacted five months later, see 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552 
(2011), nor is the fate of the proposed rider mentioned in the accompanying conference report.  
Appropriations riders originating in House budget bills must secure concurrence by both the Senate and 
President.  See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (“US legislation must be approved by both the 
House and the Senate for it to become law, and the Senate has not yet voted on this issue.”). 
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reform legislation.59  The FDA probably took more seriously the correspondence 
that it had received from various members of both the House and Senate who 
expressed concerns about the agency’s review of AquaBounty’s NADA.60  
Conversely, in faulting the FDA for lacking the expertise to review environmental 
effects (and calling for legislation requiring that a different agency undertake such 
a task),61 Wilinska entirely failed to mention the fact that Congress had five years 
earlier (after satisfying requirements for bicameralism and presentment) already 
done so.62 
E.  Supposed Procedural Irregularities 
In a Note published in 2011, Michael Homer caught this admittedly minor 
statutory provision,63 though he then proceeded to allege that the FDA had 
blatantly disregarded it, citing leaked e-mails from some civil servants accessed by 
a public interest group.64  There is far less here than meets the eye,65 and I 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Rosalind S. Helderman, House Again Votes to Repeal Health-Care Law in Symbolic 
Gesture, WASH. POST, July 12, 2012, at A4 (“It was the 33rd time that Republicans have moved to 
repeal all or parts of the legislation since the party took control of the House in January 2011.”). 
 60. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 166; see also Debra M. Strauss, The Role of Courts, Agencies, 
and Congress in GMOs: A Multilateral Approach to Ensuring the Safety of the Food Supply, 48 IDAHO 
L. REV. 267, 298 (2012) (“[M]ore than forty members of Congress sent letters requesting the FDA halt 
approval [of AquAdvantage].”); id. at 297-99 (discussing House passage of the rider, and noting the 
introduction of a pair of bills in the Senate that failed to pass); Andrew Seidman, Modified Salmon 
Faces Resistance: A Group of Senators Is Asking the FDA to Nix the Approval Process of the 
Genetically Altered Fish as Food, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A14; cf. Appel, supra note 6, at C5 
(noting that three members of the congressional delegation from Massachusetts (home of AquaBounty) 
wrote the FDA Commissioner to urge that the agency press ahead).  In the face of this congressional 
pressure, the USDA rescinded a $500,000 grant that it had made to AquaBounty.  See Pollack, supra 
note 6, at B1. 
 61. See Wilinska, supra note 16, at 164-65, 172-73. 
 62. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1007, 121 Stat. 
823, 969-70 (calling on the FDA to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in order 
“to produce a report on any environmental risks associated with genetically engineered seafood 
products, including the impact on wild fish stocks”). 
 63. See Michael Bennett Homer, Note, Frankenfish . . . It’s What’s for Dinner: The FDA, 
Genetically Engineered Salmon, and the Flawed Regulation of Biotechnology, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 83, 112 (2011).  In addition, as contrasted with Wilinska’s article, Homer showed a better 
understanding of the technology and its potential benefits, see id. at 107-09, offered a somewhat more 
nuanced account of the environmental threats, see id. at 110-12, 116, understood the nature of the 
briefing packet supplied to the advisory committee, see id. at 120, and recognized that FDA approval 
would not prevent states from imposing restrictions, see id. at 136, while his discussion of allergenicity 
and other suspected health risks, see id. at 124-29, struck me as even more over the top. 
 64. See id. at 114-15, 117-19; id. at 115 (“The e-mail describing this letter also suggested that the 
FDA had failed to consult with NMFS as required by Section 1007 of the FDAAA.”); id. at 114 n.234 
(explaining that Food & Water Watch got these through a Freedom of Information Act request); see also 
id. at 86 (“The approval process has provoked fierce criticism from countless advocacy groups . . . .”).  
Why would the FDA so blatantly disregard such a specific statutory requirement and invite judicial 
reversal of its decision? 
 65. An account of these documents published in a trade journal (the only published account that I 
could find) revealed that some lower-level employees at the Department of Interior’s Fish & Wildlife 
Service (FWS) complained about the FDA’s failure so far to consult with them as purportedly required 
under the Endangered Species Act, while the public interest group’s press release had alleged on this 
basis a failure to consult with NMFS.  See Stephen Clapp, Fish & Wildlife Service Officials Question 
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previously have criticized authors and law journals for their growing willingness to 
depend on such unreliable source material.66  Homer also cited surveys sponsored 
by these same public interest groups as demonstrating that “the American public 
overwhelmingly feels that the FDA should not introduce GE salmon to the 
marketplace.”67  Similarly, we are told, the FDA received an avalanche of adverse 
public comments,68 but this reflects nothing more than a letter-writing campaign 
orchestrated by these consumer advocacy organizations.69 
More generally, Homer offered an overly negative account of the NADA 
review.70  For instance, he suggested that the FDA lacks the statutory authority to 
reject an application solely on environmental grounds,71 echoing an oft-repeated 
charge that has no basis in fact.72  Homer also questioned the failure to route the 
                                                                                                     
GE Salmon Approval Process, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Nov. 19, 2010, at 1.  In any event, it eventually got 
around to getting the blessing of its sister agencies.  See Pollack, supra note 10, at B1 (reporting that, in 
the draft EA it released at the end of 2012, the FDA concluded that the transgenic salmon “would have 
no effect on endangered species” and that NMFS and FWS “did not disagree”). 
 66. See, e.g., Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
839, 882 n.181 (2009); see also Noah, supra note 15, ¶ 62 (noting that one author’s “basis for this 
assertion demonstrates nothing other than the fact that several self-anointed public interest groups stand 
ready to engage in scare mongering to suit their own purposes”).  Historically, the FDA has been far 
more responsive to the griping by these groups than they care to admit.  See Lars Noah, Rewarding 
Regulatory Compliance:  The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2154-55 
(2000) (“[H]ealth and safety agencies like the FDA have become more beholden to groups that purport 
to represent the public interest . . . .  [C]onsumer groups have nothing to lose by aggressively pursuing 
their agenda and vocally criticizing the agency when they fail to prevail.”). 
 67. Homer, supra note 63, at 135 (adding that “most Americans have said they would not eat any 
seafood that had been genetically engineered”).  But cf. Martin, supra note 4, at 1 (“45 percent of those 
surveyed [in 2002 by the Pew Initiative on Food & Biotechnology] thought that genetically modifying 
fish to reduce the cost was a good idea; 43 percent thought it was a bad idea”); Andrew Pollack, 
Genetically Altered Salmon Set to Move Closer to Dinner Table, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A1 
(“How consumers will react is not entirely clear.  Some public opinion surveys have shown that 
Americans are more wary about genetically engineered animals than about the genetically engineered 
crops now used in a huge number of foods.  But other polls suggest that many Americans would accept 
the animals if they offered environmental or nutritional benefits.”). 
 68. See Homer, supra note 63, at 109. 
 69. See Stephen Clapp, FDA Issues Final Guidance to Industry on Transgenic Animals, FOOD 
CHEM. NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, at 1.  A pile of signed boilerplate postcards amounts to little more than a 
petition with a bunch of signatures.  Cf. Marian Burros, Chefs Join Campaign Against Altered Fish, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at F1 (“The boycott [pledged by 200 chefs and grocers] is being led by the 
Center for Food Safety . . . .  Other environmental groups have signed on to support the boycott, along 
with 42,000 individuals.”).  For a more charitable take on this form of public participation in 
rulemaking, see Nina A. Mendelson, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
173 (2012). 
 70. See Homer, supra note 63, at 86 (“The approval process has thus far been marred by secrecy 
and institutional incompetence by the FDA . . . .”); id. at 110 (“[T]he FDA’s handling of the approval 
process for AquAdvantage salmon has demonstrated the validity of the public’s concerns . . . [and] the 
flaws in the current regulatory scheme for GE animals.”); id. at 112 (“Critics of the approval process for 
GE animals worry that the FDA is not competent to adequately address these environmental risks.”); id. 
at 119 (“[T]he FDA is either incapable of evaluating—or unwilling to properly evaluate—the 
environmental risks associated with approving GE animals.”). 
 71. See id. at 105, 112, 114 n.232; see also Justin Gillis, Old Laws, New Fish: Environmental 
Regulation of Gene-Altered Foods Is a Gray Area, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at E1. 
 72. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.D.C. 1976) (“NEPA 
provides FDA with supplementary authority to base its substantive decisions on all environmental 
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issue to the agency’s Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), “the 
FDA center typically responsible for food safety evaluations.”73 Evidently he failed 
to realize that the agency’s Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has far more 
experience in dealing with food safety issues related to drug residues in livestock, 
perhaps imagining incorrectly that it just deals with drugs for pets.74  Clearly, 
Homer did not recognize that CFSAN suffers from far more serious resource 
constraints than any other FDA division.75  Indeed, one persistent critic of the 
agency’s tendency for overregulation—a scientist who had served as the founding 
director of the FDA’s Office of Biotechnology until stepping down in 1993—urged 
CFSAN review of the transgenic salmon precisely because this would have avoided 
the delays caused by the “onerous” NADA process.76  Of course, calls for shifting 
primary responsibility to CFSAN at this late date aim solely to make matters worse 
rather than smooth the way for future applicants.77 
                                                                                                     
considerations including those not expressly identified in the FDCA and FDA’s other statutes.”); Lars 
Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About 
Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 314 n.83 (1994); Andrew C. Revkin, F.D.A. 
Considers New Tests for Environmental Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A20. 
 73. Homer, supra note 63, at 106 (“This is a curious regulatory fit for prospective GE animals 
intended for human consumption.”); see also id. at 130 (“Stripping the CVM of its jurisdiction and 
giving authority instead to . . . CFSAN would certainly be a logical improvement.”).  But see 
Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (calling such suggestions ironic because “[t]his is the very 
regulatory path that was eschewed after more than a decade of deliberations and numerous opportunities 
for public input”).  
 74. Cf. Mark Klock, A Modest Proposal to Rename the FDA: Apologists for Carcinogens, 
Teratogens, and Adulterated Drugs, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1161 (2004) (lambasting the agency for its failure 
to regulate drugs used with ornamental fish). 
 75. See Hutt, supra note 31, at 454 (explaining that CFSAN is “absolutely destitute”); id. at 459 
(discussing CFSAN’s “disintegration”); Noah & Merrill, supra note 32, at 421-22 & n.409, 433 & 
n.458; William Neuman, On Food Safety, a Long List but Little Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at 
B1; see also Dina ElBoghdady, Taking New Look at Food Inspection, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2012, at 
A1; Monica Eng, Who Tests the Safety of New Ingredients in Food?: Too Often, U.S. Lets 
Manufacturers Make the Call on Their Own Products, Critics Say, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 2012, at A1. 
 76. See Henry I. Miller, The Use and Abuse of Science in Policymaking: The Regulation of 
Biotechnology Provides a Cautionary Tale of Politicized Science, REGULATION, Summer 2012, at 26, 
32-33; Henry I. Miller, Op-Ed., Catch of the Day, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at A13 (“The FDA’s 
existing approach to [GE] foods should have been applied to genetically engineered animals.  But 
characteristically, regulators chose the most risk-averse and burdensome approach.”); see also Justin 
Gillis, Biotech Regulation Falls Short, Report Says: Pew Study Calls for Better Oversight, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 1, 2004, at E3 (reporting that the FDA’s chief counsel at the time had balked at expansively 
construing the NADA provisions to cover GE animals, preferring the informal consultation approach 
used by the agency for biotech crops); Andrew Pollack, Without U.S. Rules, Biotech Food Lacks 
Investors, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A1 (reporting that similar sentiments stalled the issuance of 
guidelines to use the NADA rather than weaker food additive pathway). 
 77. Long after the close of the original comment period, public interest organizations filed a citizen 
petition that reiterated their objections and demanded FDA review under the process used for food 
additives.  See Appel, supra note 6, at C5 (“On Feb. 7, [2012,] the Center for Food Safety and two other 
consumer advocacy groups petitioned the FDA to begin a new safety review.  That set in motion a 
process that requires the FDA to respond to the request before it makes any decision about approving 
the fish.”).  More than a decade earlier these same parties had filed a similar petition with the agency.  
See Andrew Pollack, Groups Seek Moratorium on Alteration of Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at 
A25.  Tardy involvement in licensing proceedings represents a tactic that such groups have used before 
in order to stall final FDA action.  See Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the 
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Homer credited criticisms that the public had received access to the briefing 
packet and other documents only two weeks ahead of the committee meeting, 
allegedly deviating from the two to three months typical before advisory committee 
meetings involving human drugs or devices.78  Instead of taking Consumers 
Union’s word for it, he should have consulted the Code of Federal Regulations, 
which plainly provides otherwise.79  In fact, the FDA offered greater opportunities 
for public participation than normal in such licensing proceedings.80  Homer also 
echoed complaints that the meeting took place on a weekend and in a “remote” 
location,81 failing to appreciate that most advisory committees meet adjacent to 
FDA headquarters just outside of Washington, D.C.82  By all accounts, and in spite 
of these purported obstacles to public participation, opponents had an ample 
                                                                                                     
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 66-67 n.272, 68 & n.278 (1995); cf. Monica Eng, Activists 
Taking Their Beefs Online: Battle Against “Pink Slime” Shows Growing Power of Social Media to 
Transform Nation’s Food Policy, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 1, 2012, at A15 (“In the past, food activists 
relied almost solely on citizen petitions to the FDA, though these were rarely as high profile or effective 
as the latest campaigns.”). 
 78. See Homer, supra note 63, at 121; see also id. at 122 n.283 (claiming that announcements of 
advisory committee meetings in the Federal Register normally give at least two months advance notice); 
Andrew Zajac, FDA Panel to Vote on Modified Salmon: It Grows Faster, Eats Less and Has Spawned 
Debate About Altering Animals Used for Food, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A22 (“The FDA’s 
apparent readiness to approve the AquaBounty salmon has inflamed a coalition of consumer, 
environmental, animal welfare and fishing groups, which accuse the agency of basing its judgment on 
data compiled from small samples supplied by the company, rushing the public portion of the review 
process and disclosing insufficient information about the fish.”). 
 79. See 21 C.F.R. § 14.20(a) (2012) (providing for notice “at least 15 days in advance of a meeting” 
and suggesting typically no more than one month). 
 80. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 707 (calling it “an unprecedented move toward 
increased transparency”); Andrew Zajac, No Agreement Near on Salmon Labeling; FDA Hearing Is 
Split over Who Should Alert Consumers That a Fish Is Genetically Altered, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, 
at A20.  It held a public hearing in tandem with the advisory committee meeting to address labeling 
questions.  See FDA, Notice of Public Hearing, Labeling of Food Made from AquAdvantage Salmon, 
75 Fed. Reg. 52,602 (Aug. 26, 2010); Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Hearing Focuses on the Labeling of 
Genetically Engineered Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, at B3. 
 81. See Homer, supra note 63, at 121-22.  He also echoed a common objection about fragmented 
statutory authority, citing my biotech article solely for this proposition, see id. at 101 & n.133, evidently 
not noticing that I had in that very paragraph taken pains to refute this common complaint, see Noah, 
supra note 15, ¶ 9. 
 82. See 21 C.F.R. § 14.22(b) (“All advisory committee meetings will be held in Washington, DC, or 
Rockville, MD, or the immediate vicinity, unless the Commissioner receives and approves [under 
specified criteria] a written request from the advisory committee for a different location.”); cf. Noah, 
Rewarding Regulatory Compliance, supra note 66, at 2150 (“Now let us leave the comforting confines 
of the Beltway to discover how drug labeling is regulated in the heartland.”).  Technically, Rockville 
lies just outside of the Beltway, but it hardly qualifies as a remote location, while the suggestion to hold 
hearings at sites near fishing interests very well might be far off the beaten path.  On rare occasions, the 
FDA has held public hearings or town hall meetings at locations around the country.  See, e.g., Emily 
Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 
44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 756-57 (2003) (describing public hearings about GE crops that the FDA took on 
the road during 1999); Marlene Cimons, New U.S. Seafood Safety Rules Expected to Be Unveiled, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A18 (“The FDA plans to hold a series of public meetings in nine cities, 
including Los Angeles, during the next two months to discuss the proposals.”). 
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opportunity to put in their two cents worth.83 
Finally, Homer objected to the composition of the advisory committee that 
reviewed the transgenic salmon, alleging a lack of expertise and conflicts of 
interest on the basis of a single blog posting and letter from a public interest 
group.84  As he conceded, however, the committee hardly rubber-stamped the 
agency’s tentative conclusions.85  Nonetheless, Homer exaggerated the significance 
of stray remarks made by individual members,86 evidently failing to notice that the 
official report issued by the committee shortly thereafter largely had endorsed the 
FDA’s position.87 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Mary Clare Jalonick, Genetically Modified Salmon Engineered Food Fight: FDA Panel 
Says Fast-Growing Fish Safe, but Opponents Want Approval Put on Ice, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 21, 2010, 
at A1; Lyndsey Layton, Fears over Modified Salmon Voiced, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2010, at A4. 
 84. See Homer, supra note 63, at 123-24; see also id. at 130-31 (crediting this group’s interpretation 
of the 2009 guidance document as a direct outgrowth of heavy lobbying by the biotech industry).  He 
also relied on this same public interest group’s criticism of the health effects data.  See id. at 125-27.  
For a pointed rebuttal by a pair of scientists with no apparent axe to grind (apart from their obvious 
distaste for the “alarming” and “frightening” food safety claims made by these consumer advocates), see 
Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 707-08; id. at 708 (“[T]he AquAdvantage salmon food safety 
studies do not suggest that the fastgrowth phenotype is associated with any food safety concerns.”); see 
also Miller, The Use and Abuse of Science in Policymaking, supra note 76, at 30 (objecting that the 
media “consistently len[t] exaggerated credibility and ink to the alarmist claims of anti-biotech 
activists”).  As it happens, the consumer advocate who served on the advisory committee, Greg Jaffe of 
the Center for Science in the Public Interest, “saw no cause for alarm based on the data he reviewed.”  
Mestel, supra note 7, at A1.  But see Homer, supra note 63, at 123 & n.294 (dismissing Jaffe as a lawyer 
who previously had expressed support for biotechnology in agriculture). 
 85. See Homer, supra note 63, at 124 (“Despite the questionable composition of the Committee, the 
VMAC still found ample reason to criticize the NADA, as well as the FDA’s review of the 
application.”); id. at 128 (“Despite the VMAC’s stacked membership . . . , [it] nonetheless concluded 
that the FDA should pursue a more rigorous analysis of the GE salmon’s possible health effects and 
environmental risks before granting approval.”); Andrew Zajac et al., Panel Tackles Salmon 
Engineering: One Member Says FDA Will Likely OK Genetically Modified Fish, but Not Soon, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 21, 2010, at A13. 
 86. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (objecting to the fact that advocacy groups who 
wrote the FDA Commissioner to demand the preparation of an EIS were “selecting excerpts from the 
public meetings to support their contention,” adding that “it has been suggested that NEPA requirements 
are being used by some environmental groups (for example, the Center for Food Safety) as a legal 
approach to slow or prevent regulatory approvals of products to which they are opposed”); cf. Noah, 
supra note 66, at 871 & n.135 (criticizing a federal appellate court for giving “exaggerated significance 
to the comments of the advisory committee, disregarding the fact that the FDA had undertaken a lengthy 
internal review (and had no obligation to abide by the committee’s recommendations) and that the 
committee had in the end recommended approval,” thereby “turn[ing] a complex risk-utility judgment, 
using data from less than ideal clinical trials, into a no-brainer by allowing the jury to conclude that the 
drug was totally ineffective”). 
 87. See David Senior, VMAC Meeting: September 20, 2010, Chairman’s Report (Oct. 14, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicine
AdvisoryCommittee/UCM230467.pdf.  For instance, on the question of food safety, “[t]he committee 
deemed the studies selected to evaluate this question to be overall appropriate and a large number of test 
results established similarities and equivalence between AquAdvantage Salmon and Atlantic salmon.”  
Id. at 2.  As for environmental concerns, “[a]lthough the committee recognized that the risk of escape 
from either facility could never be zero, the multiple barriers to escape at both the PEI [Prince Edward 
Island] and Panama facilities were extensive . . . .  [I]t is the committee’s understanding that both 
facilities will be regulated as ‘drug manufacturing’ locations, which carries a high level of FDA 
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F.  Exaggerated Environmental Concerns 
More than anything else, critics fear that transgenic salmon would manage to 
escape.  To be sure, non-GE farmed fish routinely get out from aquaculture net 
pens in the open water,88 and their selective breeding may threaten native salmon.89  
Wild populations of Atlantic salmon face all manner of threats already,90 and some 
attempted fixes for dwindling salmon are environmentally irresponsible.91  In what 
way would transgenic salmon make things any worse?  Critics routinely invoke the 
“Trojan gene” hypothesis, which suggests that GE fish might enjoy a mating 
advantage but otherwise lack fitness in the wild, resulting after several generations 
                                                                                                     
scrutiny.”  Id. at 3; see also Jeffrey L. Fox, Transgenic Salmon Inches Toward Finish Line, 28 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 1141, 1142 (2010); Pollack, supra note 6, at B1 (“[A] committee of outside advisers, while 
finding various faults with the F.D.A. analysis, more or less endorsed its conclusion that the fish would 
be safe for consumers and the environment.”).  Homer cited this document only twice (far less often 
than the transcript of the meeting), and only for purposes of highlighting caveats or suggestions for 
possible avenues of future research, see Homer, supra note 63, at 125 & n.308 (noting a suggested need 
for an environmental impact statement if the sponsor planned on using additional facilities, failing to 
include in his quotation from page 3 of the Chairman’s Report the fact that only “certain committee 
members raised” this concern), and then completely exaggerating the point, see id. at 128 & n.326 
(claiming that it wanted “a more rigorous analysis of the GE salmon’s possible health effects and 
environmental risks before granting approval” (emphasis added)). 
 88. In 2000, a storm allowed more than 100,000 salmon to escape a fish farm in Maine.  See 
Stokstad, supra note 22, at 1797; see also U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of Me., 
LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412, 420-22, 434, 435-36 (D. Me.) (holding that farmed salmon threatened 
native populations upon escape and qualified as a “pollutant” under the Clean Water Act, and granting a 
permanent injunction against the stocking of net pens with non-native salmon), aff’d, 339 F.3d 23, 28-
30, 33 (1st Cir. 2003); id. at 421-22, 428 n.17 (discussing the prospect of future escapes of transgenic 
salmon); Homer, supra note 63, at 118 n.262 (“[G]rowing GE salmon in ocean net-pens in Maine was 
banned by the FWS and NMFS in order to ‘eliminate the potentially adverse disease and ecological risks 
posed by the use of transgenic salmonids in aquaculture.’”).  Imagine what a weather event with a more 
menacing name could do.  See Yamiche Alcindor & Doyle Rice, East Coast Braces for 
“Frankenstorm,” USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2012, at 3A. 
 89. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (“In principle, there is no difference between the 
types of concerns and potential magnitude of the environmental risks associated with the escape of GE 
fish and those related to the annual escape of the millions of fish that are genetically divergent from 
native populations in other ways . . . .”); see also William K. Hershberger et al., Genetic Changes in the 
Growth of Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) in Marine Net-Pens, Produced by Ten Years of 
Selection, 85 AQUACULTURE 187, 195 (1990) (finding “a large increase in growth,” comparable to other 
selective breeding efforts that reported growth gains of, for instance, “30% per generation for Atlantic 
salmon”); Stokstad, supra note 22, at 1797 (“Farmed salmon are big, hungry, and aggressive.”); Alexei 
Barrionuevo, Virus Kills Chile’s Salmon and Indicts Its Fishing Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, at 
A6. 
 90. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h), 224.101(a) (2012); see also Endangered and Threatened Species:  
Final Endangered Status for a Distinct Population Segment of Anadromous Atlantic Salmon (Salmo 
salar) in the Gulf of Maine, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,459 (Nov. 17, 2000) (setting forth the basis for this listing), 
amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,344, 29,385 (June 19, 2009); Joan Nathan, Don’t Look for Nova in Nova 
Scotia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at D3 (reporting that, in the vicinity of Nova Scotia, “Atlantic 
salmon were fished out 30 years ago,” and that, in New York markets, “salmon today comes mostly 
from farms off the coasts of Norway, Chile, Scotland and Canada”). 
 91. See Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Has Ocean Experts Outraged, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2012, at A1 (reporting the unauthorized and roundly criticized dumping of 100 tons of iron dust 
into the north Pacific Ocean done partly to help the local salmon population recover by triggering a 
plankton bloom). 
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in the extinction of the native species.92  These critics generally fail to mention that 
the scientist who originally proposed this idea had testified before the VMAC to 
explain its inapplicability to the transgenic salmon under review.93 
Indeed, transgenic salmon may offer distinct ecological advantages over 
current fish farming.  AquaBounty planned to use landlocked containment facilities 
distant from potential tributaries.94 Critics made much of the fact that the company 
eventually hoped to sell eggs for other aquaculture firms to raise, which would 
differ from the facilities specified in its application.95  The sponsor would, 
however, first have to secure supplemental approval from the FDA.96  Are we to 
assume that AquaBounty plans to violate the limited terms of its requested 
license—in that case, why would it not already have proceeded with its plans using 
those non-U.S. facilities even in the absence of any FDA approval?97  Moving 
toward domestic production in the future would help to reduce its carbon 
footprint,98 and careful selection of sites for inland tanks—not Portland (on either 
coast), but Tulsa or Omaha for example—would minimize ecological risks in the 
event of any escape. 
AquaBounty also proposed to adopt mechanisms of “biological containment” 
by creating only female fish and inducing sterility through triploidy,99 though these 
would offer no guarantee against the risk of interbreeding in the event of escape.100  
                                                                                                     
 92. See, e.g., Homer, supra note 63, at 111. 
 93. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 708-09; id. at 709 (explaining that this testimony 
“appears to have been largely ignored”); Peter Fimrite, Activists Resist Bioengineered Salmon, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 27, 2010, at A1; see also Homer, supra note 63, at 111 n.211 (noting this testimony). 
 94. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 707 (AquAdvantage salmon would be “produced at a 
single facility in Canada, and grown out in a fresh water, land-based culture facility in Panama.  Both 
locations were inspected by FDA and featured simultaneous, multiple and redundant physical and 
geographical containment measures, effectively precluding concerns about the possibility of transgenic 
fish escape.”); id. at 708 (concluding that the risk of escape “was seen to be extremely small” in light of 
“land-based production with physical confinement barriers (screens)” and “thermally lethal lake and 
stream temperatures downstream from the proposed production facility in Panama—and high salinity of 
waters surrounding the Canadian location”). 
 95. See Homer, supra note 63, at 108, 118; Wilinska, supra note 16, at 163, 171. 
 96. See Pollack, supra note 10, at B1 (“[O]ther facilities for growing the salmon would require 
separate approvals.”). 
 97. Cf. Kaufman, supra note 4, at A1 (“Because of a loophole in the rules governing the importing 
of animal drugs, engineered salmon raised abroad could . . . be imported if the FDA finds them to be 
safe for human consumption before tackling the more complex and time-consuming process of 
determining environmental safety.”).  If one believes the critics, then the supposed ambiguity over the 
agency’s jurisdiction suggests that the folks at AquaBounty were chumps to ask for a NADA in the first 
place.  Cf. Gillis, supra note 71, at E1 (explaining the company’s tactical choice); Pollack, supra note 
34, at A16 (same). 
 98. See Clausen & Longo, supra note 14, at 245 (“[T]he zigzag transport from Canada to Panama to 
the US adds tremendous food miles to an already energy-intensive production scheme.”). 
 99. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 707 (“[A]s an extra precaution, additional levels of 
biological containment were proposed, including the production of 100% female fish and triploidy 
induction with an average success rate of 99.8% (98.9-100%).  All-female fish are unable to interbreed 
with each other, and triploidy results in sterility.”); see also Andrew Pollack, No Foolproof Way Is Seen 
to Contain Altered Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A10.  Producing only females also happens to 
help AquaBounty guard against unlicensed reproduction of its GE salmon. 
 100. See Homer, supra note 63, at 118 (quoting a 5% failure rate); Wilinska, supra note 16, at 150, 
164, 172 (same). 
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As compared to traditionally farmed salmon, however, the transgenic salmon 
should pose less of a threat: inland tanks raise costs, but the efficiencies promised 
by the AquAdvantage (in speed to market and improved feed conversion) would 
offset these, offering the possibility that they could outcompete in the marketplace 
farmed salmon raised in net pens, displacing that far more deleterious method of 
production.101  If nothing else, the availability of fast growing and ultimately 
cheaper transgenics may counterbalance overfishing and the depletion of native 
stocks,102 more than offsetting any speculative risk of escapees intermingling with 
their wild relatives. 
Calling some of the published commentary incompetent and unduly alarmist 
hardly means that we have nothing to learn or fear from transgenic salmon.  Indeed, 
while AquaBounty’s NADA poses relatively straightforward questions, other GE 
animals under development very well could confound regulatory officials in the 
future.103  Although transgenic livestock should not present the same sorts of 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at A1 (“Even some critics of genetically modified salmon 
acknowledge that [a shift to inland tanks] could protect wild salmon from damage being done by fish 
farming.”); Pollack, supra note 10, at B1 (“AquaBounty has argued that the faster growth of its fish 
makes it feasible to rear them in inland tanks rather than ocean pens, reducing the environmental 
impact.”); Andrew Zajac, Is Engineered “Frankenfish” Coming to the Nation’s Table?: AquaBounty 
Seeks Approval for Salmon That Reaches Market Weight in Half the Usual Time, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2010, at B1 (AquaBounty “hopes to avoid the pollution, disease and other problems associated with 
saltwater fish farms by having its salmon raised in inland facilities.”).  Then again, if transgenic salmon 
reduce production costs and increase market demand, this might magnify the adverse effects from 
expanded aquaculture operations and threaten to deplete wild stocks of fatty fish used to produce fish oil 
for salmon feed.  See Smith et al., supra note 39, at 1053.  If, however, that reduces consumption of 
beef, see id. at 1052-53, the net environmental effects may well remain favorable.  Tissue engineers 
have begun serious work on the real solution.  See Scott Canon, Meat from a Petri Dish: Credible or 
Inedible?  Proponents See Ecological, Ethical, Financial Benefits, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 2011, at A14; 
Tiffany Hsu, Burger Made of Lab-Grown Meat Is in the Works, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at B4.  No 
doubt the luddites and livestock lobbies will rail against such advances as well. 
 102. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (“Wild-caught fish deplete the oceanic stocks and 
do not present a long-term, ecologically sustainable solution to rising global fish demand.  One of the 
benefits associated with the development of GE fish for aquaculture may well be in helping to reduce 
recognized pressure on wild fish populations.”); Rasmussen & Morrisey, supra note 24, at 3 (“Use of 
biotechnology in aquaculture has the potential to alleviate these predicted fish shortages and price 
increases by enhancing production efficiency . . . .”); Devra First, Tipping the Scales Genetically: To Its 
Critics, Fast-growing Modified Salmon Is a Threat; To Its Mass. Creators, It Is a Fix to Shortages and 
Overfishing, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2010, at B1.  Because transgenic salmon reach market size using 
less feed, they also could reduce pressures on wild populations of the smaller fish used to produce their 
feed.  See Kenneth R. Weiss, It Came from the Gene Lab: Faster-growing Salmon?  Aquarium Fish 
That Glow in the Dark?  Regulators Are at a Crossroads over Bioengineered Animals, L.A. TIMES, May 
14, 2003, at A1 (“Raising salmon on less food is an important advance.  It now takes about 2½ pounds 
of wild fish ground into meal to produce one pound of farmed salmon.  For that reason, feeding salmon 
on those proliferating farms contributes to the overfishing that is rapidly depleting the world’s oceans.”). 
 103. See Homer, supra note 63, at 91 (“[D]ozens of other GE animals are in development.  One such 
animal is ‘Enviropig,’ a pig engineered to better digest phosphates, making it more environmentally 
friendly and less expensive to feed.  Livestock such as cows, chicken, pigs, and goats, and numerous 
varieties of farmed fish, are being genetically engineered to enhance disease resistance and other 
qualities.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 91-92 (“For example, researchers are currently developing dairy 
cows resistant to mastitis, cows resistant to bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or ‘mad cow disease,’ 
and chickens resistant to avian flu.  Other food animals are being developed with enhanced nutritional 
2013] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE “FRANKENFISH”? 623 
environmental concerns,104 they might pose more difficult food safety questions. 
II.  LICENSING HELD HOSTAGE TO POLITICS 
More than two years have elapsed since the FDA held its advisory committee 
meeting to review its tentative conclusions favoring approval of the transgenic 
salmon.  That unquestionably amounts to an unusual delay,105 which may 
discourage other innovation in the field.106  In the case of transgenic salmon, the 
agency may have taken the advisory committee’s feedback seriously and decided to 
revisit issues that it previously had viewed as nearly settled.  More likely, it took 
seriously the pressure emanating from members of Congress who had—hook, line, 
and sinker—bought into the charges leveled by opponents,107 and consumer 
                                                                                                     
values for humans, such as hens genetically engineered to lay low-cholesterol eggs.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Mestel, supra note 7, at A1 (providing updates on some of these and other efforts). 
 104. Cf. Jackson Landers, Are Wild Pigs Headed for the Beltway?, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2012, at 
E1 (“It takes generations in the wild for domestic pigs to revert to a wild-type body.  These pigs can 
have a hard time becoming established in the face of predators such as bobcats and coyotes and direct 
competition from deer for food.”); id. (reporting that thirty-six states have wild pigs, with Texas 
harboring the largest population at 3.4 million, and that they cause an estimated $1.5 billion in damage 
annually in addition to threatening native wildlife); Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Says Food Supply May 
Contain Altered Pigs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A26. 
 105. See Dennis, supra note 10, at A1 (“How long [after the release of the agency’s draft EA at the 
end of 2012] a final approval might take is anyone’s guess.  AquaBounty first applied for permission to 
sell its genetically altered fish in 1995, and even by FDA standards, its application has moved at a 
glacial pace in recent years.”); Mestel, supra note 7, at A1 (describing the process as “a hopeless 
logjam,” with the transgenic salmon stuck “in regulatory limbo”). 
 106. See Greg Cima, Salmon Could Show Path for Transgenic Animals, 237 J. AM. VETERINARY 
MED. ASS’N 1113 (2011); Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709 (“The abuse of good-faith attempts 
to increase transparency and enable public participation in the GE animal regulatory process, coupled 
with political efforts to prohibit the FDA from regulating GE AquAdvantage salmon as it approaches 
the close of its protracted regulatory journey, are unlikely to have reassured potential investors.”); 
Mestel, supra note 7, at A1 (“[T]he slow pace of progress on AquaBounty’s application has had a 
chilling effect on animal biotech efforts—which are conducted in academic laboratories and small 
companies, not by the multinational corporations that develop genetically modified plants.  Efforts have 
been foundering for lack of funding, or moving overseas.”); see also Noah & Merrill, supra note 32, at 
426 n.433, 428-29 & n.445. 
 107. See Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 24, at 709; Miller, The Use and Abuse of Science in 
Policymaking, supra note 76, at 31-33. The company certainly saw it that way, as explained in a brief 
update published by its CEO: 
[T]he activist community essentially ignored the released data and persisted in 
inflammatory and unsubstantiated attacks upon both AquaBounty and the FDA.  
Additional opposition also emerged from some in the capture fisheries industry, who 
view the AquaBounty technology as an economic threat.  Congressional representatives 
from Alaska, California, Washington, and Oregon have introduced bills in Congress to 
ban or label AquAdvantage salmon. The rhetoric from these individuals has not been 
based on their economic concerns, but rather seized upon the inflammatory rhetoric and 
fear mongering of the antitechnology groups, ignoring the FDA and other independent 
scientific reviews. 
Ronald Stotish, AquAdvantage Salmon: Pioneer or Pyrrhic Victory, 21 TRANSGENIC RESEARCH 913, 
914 (2012); see also Editorial, Science and Salmon, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A10 (“[E]ight senators 
from salmon-fishing states are warning the [FDA] that they will pursue legislation—already passed in 
the House—to keep the FDA from using any of its funding to study whether genetically modified 
salmon are safe for the environment and consumers.”). 
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activists kept up their pressure by filing a citizen petition long after the public 
comment period had closed.108  Once it sensed that the question had become unduly 
politicized, the FDA apparently got spooked and lost the courage to act on its 
original convictions.109  The publication of its draft EA at the end of 2012 renewed 
hope that the agency might soon reach a final decision on AquaBounty’s NADA,110 
but, in light of what has happened to this point, I wouldn’t bet the (fish) farm on it. 
Politics have intruded into FDA licensing decisions in the past.111  The most 
visible recent example involved efforts to switch the emergency contraceptive 
product (marketed as “Plan B”) to nonprescription status.  Notwithstanding internal 
and external recommendations to do so, the agency repeatedly stalled and then only 
grudgingly authorized partial over-the-counter (OTC) marketing.112  After 
exhaustively cataloguing various shenanigans that had occurred during the review 
process, a federal court ordered the FDA to revisit the age-restriction that it had 
imposed.113  Even with the transition to the Obama administration, political 
considerations continued to intrude upon scientific judgments: immediately after 
the new FDA Commissioner announced plans to approve unrestricted OTC access, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) overrode her subordinate.114 
Even if politics play a legitimate role in agency rulemaking, such extraneous 
influences generally should have no place in adjudicatory proceedings.115  If the 
FDA has changed its view of the merits (even if solely at the direction of higher 
ups in the Executive branch), then it should reject AquaBounty’s application 
                                                                                                     
 108. See supra note 77. 
 109. See Mestel, supra note 7, at A1 (“[M]any animal geneticists said they suspected the regulatory 
stalling on the AquaBounty case had more to do with politics than an inefficient or overly fastidious 
FDA . . . .  Some scientists say they suspect the roadblock is higher up in the Department of Health and 
Human Services or even the White House.”). 
 110. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
 111. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 57, at 572-74, 583-85, 591-93 (discussing the abortifacient 
mifepristone); Lyndsey Layton, FDA Reports Political Pressure over Implant: Approved Knee Device 
Will Be Reviewed, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A21 (discussing controversy over a premarket 
clearance granted to Regen Biologics). 
 112. See Susan F. Wood, The Role of Science in Health Policy Decision-Making: The Case of 
Emergency Contraception, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 280-88 (2007); Rob Stein, Plan B Use Surges, and 
So Does Controversy, WASH. POST, July 13, 2007, at A1. 
 113. See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526-38, 544-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  Remarkably, 
conservative public interest groups also had challenged the partial OTC switch.  See Ass’n Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing and had failed to exhaust administrative remedies); id. at 11 (noting that they too alleged that 
the FDA had been “improperly influenced by political pressure”). 
 114. See Rob Stein, Wider Access to Plan B Is Rejected: HHS Overrules FDA’s Decision, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1; see also Alastair J.J. Wood et al., The Politics of Emergency Contraception, 
366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (2011); Gardiner Harris, White House and the F.D.A. Often at Odds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, at A1.  A federal court recently invalidated this decision as tainted by politics.  See 
Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-CV-763 (ERK)(VVP), 2013 WL 1348656 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013); see 
also Pam Belluck, Judge Overturns Age Limit to Buy a Contraceptive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2013, at A1 
(noting that the “acidly worded” opinion “accused the Obama administration of putting politics ahead of 
science”). 
 115. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1141 & n.68, 1143 (2010); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 n.14, 48 & n.215 (2009); see also Noah, supra 
note 77, at 58-59, 64-70 (discussing the need for restrictions on rights of public participation). 
2013] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE “FRANKENFISH”? 625 
forthrightly and defend that judgment—while a formal judicial challenge seems 
unlikely, and those in the public interest community will declare victory, the 
agency can expect a skeptical response from the scientific community.  Stalling in 
the hopes that the problem will simply go away on its own (by bankrupting the 
sponsor) demonstrates a pathetic lack of courage. 
 
  
